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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Panel 25. Contemporary Acquisition Issues 
Thursday, May 17, 2012  
3:30 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
Chair: Harry Hallock, Deputy Director, Army Contracting Command 
Applying the Three C’s of Sustainable Development to Defense Department 
Planning 
Elliot Maltz, Willamette University 
Past Performance as an Indicator of Future Performance: Selecting an Industry 
Partner to Maximize the Probability of Program Success 
James Bradshaw and Su Chang 
The MITRE Corporation 
Contracting Officer Workload and Contingency Contracting: Evidence From 
the Department of Defense 
Patrick Warren and Nancy Huff 
Clemson University 
Harry Hallock—Mr. Hallock became deputy director of the U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC), 
a major subordinate command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), on October 3, 2011. 
ACC, headquartered at Redstone Arsenal, AL, includes two subordinate commands, the Mission and 
Installation Contracting Command and the Expeditionary Contracting Command; and six major 
contracting centers that support AMC’s other major subordinate and life cycle management 
commands. ACC provides global contracting support to warfighters through the full spectrum of 
military operations. ACC consists of more than 5,800 military and civilian personnel worldwide who 
awarded and managed nearly 198,000 contractual actions valued at an estimated $86.8 billion in 
fiscal year 2011. 
Mr. Hallock previously served as executive director of the ACC Contracting Center in Warren, MI. 
As the senior civilian procurement authority, he also advised the Tank-Automotive and Armaments 
Command (TACOM) Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) commanding general on the total 
acquisition process, including policy development, compliance and review, contract pricing, contract 
management, and associated support. 
At ACC-Warren, Mr. Hallock oversaw warfighting readiness for the Soldier by providing 
contracting and acquisition support for combat and tactical vehicle systems, deployment and Soldier 
support equipment, and armament. He directed more than 800 civilian and military personnel located 
at six separate geographic sites and who administer more than $119 billion in active contracts. Since 
fiscal year 2007, the contracting center has executed more than 113,536 contract actions totaling 
$100.2 billion in obligations. Mr. Hallock was responsible for contracting offices located at Rock Island 
Arsenal, IL; Anniston Army Depot, AL; Red River Army Depot, TX; Sierra Army Depot, CA; and 
Watervliet Arsenal, NY; as well as the headquarters in Warren, MI. 
Mr. Hallock was appointed to the senior executive service on May 13, 2007. Before his 
appointment, he served as the associate director for operations, and prior to that as chief of the 
research and development (R&D) and the installation support contracting division in Warren, MI. 
Mr. Hallock holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Delaware in Newark, DE, and a 
master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He is Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act Level III certified in Contracting, Program Management and Logistics. 
Mr. Hallock has received the Department of the Army Achievement Medal for Civilian Service and the 
Department of the Army Commander’s Award for Public Service. 
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Past Performance as an Indicator of Future Performance: 
Selecting an Industry Partner to Maximize the Probability 
of Program Success1 
James Bradshaw—Mr. Bradshaw has more than three decades of information technology 
acquisition experience in the areas of proposal development, project management, and purchasing 
management. He has implemented improved source selection and project delivery processes 
supporting government and commercial programs. Mr. Bradshaw is currently a senior economic 
business analyst and group leader with the MITRE Corporation, and holds professional certifications 
in project management (PMP) and purchasing management (C.P.M.). [jbradshaw@mitre.org] 
Su Chang—Su Chang has 10 years of experience and has worked for both the DoD and civilian 
government agencies. She currently specializes in defense contracting and acquisition reform 
initiatives. She is a principal economic business analyst and group leader with the MITRE 
Corporation. Ms. Chang has been certified as DAWIA Level III in Contracting and is a former 1102 
civilian contract negotiator. [sjchang@mitre.org] 
Abstract 
The federal contracting process should enable a government organization to select a 
contractor that will become a true business partner. Today’s source selection processes 
provide opportunities to evaluate how well a contractor proposes a solution; however, the 
government’s processes, policies, and tools are ill suited to evaluating how well a contractor 
can be expected to deliver on its proposed solutions. Like most government agencies, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) relies too heavily on the contractor’s proposal—what the 
contractor claims it can do—versus evaluating past performance to determine what a 
contractor has proven it can do. The lack of adequate past performance data and of 
processes to effectively evaluate the qualifications of companies, including examples of the 
contractor’s trustworthiness and key personnel, has contributed to a series of program 
failures, cost overruns, and schedule delays. Without adequate data and processes to 
address these issues, the DoD runs the risk of duplicating these program failures and missing 
the opportunity to capture this information and prevent repeated mistakes with the same 
contractor. 
Executive Summary 
The federal contracting process should enable a government organization to select a 
contractor that will become a true business partner. Today’s source selection processes 
provide opportunities to evaluate how well a contractor proposes a solution; however, the 
government’s processes, policies, and tools are ill suited to evaluating how well a contractor 
can be expected to deliver on its proposed solutions. Like most government agencies, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) relies too heavily on the contractor’s proposal—what the 
contractor claims it can do—versus evaluating past performance to determine what a 
contractor has proven it can do. As selecting the right contractor is perhaps the most 
important contributor to program success, this report discusses the following three problem 
areas and recommends approaches to improve the probability of a successful program 
outcome. 
Emphasis on evaluating the contractor’s proposed solution versus evaluating 
the contractor’s record of performance. During the source selection process the 
government evaluates a contractor’s proposal, which consists of cost, technical, and past 
                                                
1 The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of The MITRE Corporation and should 
not be construed as an official government position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other 
documentation. Approved for Public Release 12-1663. Distribution unlimited. ©2012 The MITRE Corporation. All 
rights reserved. 
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performance volumes. In most cases, however, past performance has little or no impact on 
the final selection. Instead, this aspect often is minimized as a superficial pass/fail test rather 
than being viewed as an effective tool to predict how well a contractor will perform in the 
future. Without objective information on past performance and processes to evaluate 
contractor qualifications, government agencies are reluctant to discriminate among 
proposals based on past performance, especially given the risk of protest. Alpha contracting 
negotiations with pre-qualified vendor candidates and product demonstrations as part of the 
source selection offer potential solutions to mitigate this evaluation risk.  
Lack of consistent and thorough processes to evaluate proposed key 
contractor personnel. The personnel on the contractor program team make vital 
contributions to successful program execution, and, as such, their qualifications should be 
an important evaluation factor. Contractors generally identify key personnel and include their 
resumes as part of the proposal package, but most source selections limit evaluation of 
these key personnel to a simple determination of whether the proposed team members 
meet experience criteria. The DoD could augment this evaluation by including oral 
presentations in the evaluation process and using the Q&A process to verify the 
qualifications and experience cited in proposed key personnel resumes.  
Inadequacy of government repositories of past performance data. The ability to 
evaluate past performance effectively depends heavily on the availability of tools and the 
quality of data. The government is currently improving and consolidating its repositories of 
past performance data; however, standards for capabilities and data-entry requirements are 
inconsistently enforced across the DoD. To address these shortcomings, the DoD should 
issue a policy mandate that enforces data-entry standards and use an online tool to track 
and report compliance with this policy mandate. Data-repository tools should also be 
improved to include quantifiable metrics as new data fields and provide capabilities to 
upload validated contract deliverables. 
Introduction 
Selecting the right contractor is perhaps the most critical factor in achieving future 
program success. This research identifies processes and proposes strategies that could 
strengthen how the government, specifically the Department of Defense (DoD), selects an 
industry partner to maximize the probability of program success.  
Ideally, the relationship between the government and a contractor should be a 
genuine business partnership. When awarding a contract for a major weapon system or 
program, especially one that requires significant development, the DoD must expect the 
relationship to be a long-term commitment. The contractor and government program 
management office (PMO) each play numerous critical roles throughout the program 
planning, executing, and reporting cycles. In a successful program, a contractor organization 
and the PMO work in harmony to strive toward program success. They understand and 
leverage each other’s strengths: they communicate frequently; they collectively manage the 
vast web of program stakeholders; and they collectively establish the reputation and 
credibility of the program.  
The government must, therefore, strive to enter into business relationships that 
provide high confidence of success. Selecting an experienced and qualified business 
partner is a critical step in achieving this objective. While evaluation of the contractor’s 
proposal is important, this review can provide only a prediction of what may happen and a 
description of how the contractor plans to perform. By contrast, the contractor’s experience 
and past performance offer objective measures of what the firm has accomplished in the 
past. 
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The paper identifies three key problem areas: 
1. The DoD evaluates the contractor’s proposed solution rather than the 
contractor’s record of performance. During the source selection process, the 
DoD evaluates a contractor’s proposal, which consists of cost, technical, and 
past performance volumes. In most cases, however, past performance has 
little or no impact on the final selection of a contractor. Instead, this aspect 
often is minimized as a superficial pass/fail test rather than being viewed as 
an effective tool to predict how well a contractor will perform in the future. 
Without objective information on past performance and processes to evaluate 
contractor qualifications, the DoD is reluctant to discriminate among 
proposals based on past performance, especially given the risk of protest. 
2. The DoD lacks consistent and thorough processes to evaluate key personnel. 
The personnel on the contractor program team make vital contributions to 
program success, and, as such, their qualifications should be an important 
evaluation factor. Contractors generally identify key personnel and include 
their resumes as part of the proposal package, but most source selections 
limit evaluation of these key personnel to a simple determination of whether 
the proposed team members meet the experience criteria. 
3. The DoD lacks adequate tools to collect, analyze, and report past 
performance information consistently across contracts. The ability to evaluate 
past performance effectively depends heavily on the availability of tools and 
the quality of data content. The government is currently improving and 
consolidating its repositories of past performance data; however, the DoD 
lacks capabilities for information collection and has not consistently enforced 
data entry requirements.  
These problem areas represent three different deficiencies in the evaluation of a 
contractor’s past performance. Evaluation is hampered by the lack of adequate tools to 
collect, analyze, and report relevant information. The lack of processes to assess the 
capabilities and experience of key personnel puts at risk the government’s ability to predict 
future performance on a contract. In addition, the ability to collect, analyze, and report 
information on past performance is impaired by the lack of policies and processes to 
incentivize better reporting. Together, these shortcomings affect the overall contracting 
process and contribute to a cycle of inadequacies that has resulted in the numerous 
contracting challenges we face today. The DoD needs to take a comprehensive, coherent 
approach to resolve these problems to achieve overall past performance improvements. 
Background 
With the passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Congress 
acknowledged that it is appropriate and relevant for the government to consider a 
contractor’s past performance in evaluating whether that contractor should receive future 
work (Inspector General, 2008, p. i).In response, federal departments initiated procedures 
and systems to record and use information on past contractor performance during source 
selection. Although the government recognizes that systematically documenting the 
contractor’s performance becomes a powerful motivator for a contractor to sustain high-
quality efforts, a consistent process for recording performance has been difficult to 
instantiate and maintain (Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP], Office of 
Management and Budget [OMB], Executive Office of the President, 2000, p. 1). 
In May 2010, the OFPP directed government agencies to integrate past performance 
data systems in order to provide consistency and ensure reliability of data across the federal 
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government. The Acquisition Committee for eGovernment (ACE) determined that the entire 
federal government will use the DoD Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting 
System (CPARS) as the single system for collecting and transmitting performance 
evaluations to the Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS, n.d.). The Navy 
created CPARS in 1998 to meet information requirements established by the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Due to inconsistent CPARS data collection and reporting, the 
DoD published a best practices guide titled A Guide to Collection and Use of Past 
Performance Information in May 2003. In June 2007, the DoD issued another CPARS Policy 
Guide that required all new contracts within a certain dollar threshold to register in CPARS 
within 30 days of contract award (Inspector General, 2008, p. 5).  
On January 21, 2011, the former OFPP Administrator, Daniel Gordon, sent a 
memorandum to chief acquisition officers and senior procurement executives on enhancing 
assessments of contractor past performance, which included steps and strategies for 
improving the collection of information on past performance. The memorandum (Gordon, 
2011) emphasized that while compliance with reporting requirements is important, the 
quality of the reports submitted is far more crucial. It also acknowledged various challenges 
that contribute to the low number and quality of these assessments, which include staff 
shortages and the transition to the new federal-wide system that integrates the PPIRS, 
CPARS, and the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPPIS).  
Despite efforts by the DoD and other government organizations, all of the policies 
and mandates lack enforcement mechanisms to incentivize better behavior and improve 
past-performance practices. This paper recommends solutions that will strengthen the data, 
processes, and tools associated with evaluating past performance and provide the 
government with a strategy to benefit from overall improvements in past performance 
processes, policies, and tools. 
Problem: The DoD Evaluates the Contractor’s Proposed Solution Versus 
Evaluating the Contractor’s Record of Performance 
FAR (2010) Part 15.3 covers the selection of a contractor in competitive negotiations. 
According to the FAR (2010), the government is required to evaluate three areas for 
acquisitions: the quality of the proposed product or service, the price or cost to the 
government, and past performance (for acquisitions that exceed the simplified acquisition 
threshold). The government often requests the contractor to submit volumes covering 
technical, cost, and past performance as part of its proposal. The technical proposal 
conveys the contractor’s proposed technical solution or response to a requirement; the cost 
proposal identifies the proposed costs of delivering the proposed technical solution; and the 
past performance volume shows how the contractor performed on previous similar or related 
efforts as an early indicator of potential future performance.  
Unfortunately, the DoD currently lacks both adequate data on past performance and 
effective processes to evaluate a company’s qualifications, including key personnel. Thus, 
evaluation of past performance is often not used effectively to predict future performance on 
a contract. These conclusions are borne out by a 2009 study by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). The study examined past performance practices by analyzing 
62 procurements in five agencies that perform major acquisitions: the DoD, the Department 
of Energy (DOE), the GSA, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The study (GAO, 2009, pp. 8–9) found that 
82% of the past performance evaluations did not contain narratives sufficiently detailed to 
establish that the resulting ratings were credible or justifiable.  
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In many of these acquisitions, the government cited a company’s technical approach 
as the most important non-cost factor. More than 60% of the contracting officers “stated that 
past performance is rarely or never a deciding factor in selecting a contractor” (GAO, 2009, 
pp. 8–9). However, the acquisitions that placed emphasis on past performance noted that 
this encouraged companies to perform better (GAO, 2009, pp. 2–3). The report succinctly 
concluded, “Regardless of the source used, contracting officials agreed that for past 
performance information to be meaningful in contract award decisions, it must be 
documented, relevant, and reliable” (GAO, 2009, pp. 8–9). 
Without such information, the government must rely heavily on other evaluation 
factors (primarily technical and cost) that describe a hypothetical situation: how the 
contractor plans to perform on a contract. In essence, this means that evaluations are based 
on the quality of a document produced by a professional proposal writing team during the 
45–90 day solicitation timeframe. These teams specialize in showcasing their company’s 
capabilities; they are not necessarily experts in devising solutions that lie within the 
company’s technical capabilities and that the company can execute with acceptable risk. 
Proposals are often written with little or no input from the staff members who will execute the 
day-to-day contract requirements. As a result, proposals submitted for competitive source 
selections often present “optimistic” solutions that carry significant inherent risk. This risk 
often materializes during contract execution, which directly contributes to the program 
failures, cost overruns, and schedule delays that are endemic to DoD acquisitions. The 
heavy scrutiny of technical and cost proposal evaluations can prove a wasted exercise when 
contractors continually overrun budgets or require major engineering change proposals 
(ECPs) throughout the life of the acquisition. 
Given the shortcomings described previously, the evaluation of past performance 
often becomes a superficial pass/fail test. The majority of best value source selections 
require the government to evaluate past performance on the basis of a sliding scale that 
ranges from high confidence to no confidence. The DoD uses this scale to assess its level of 
confidence in a contractor’s ability to perform based on previous related experience. Without 
adequate information about all offerors, the DoD is reluctant to place strong emphasis on 
past performance, especially due to the high risk of protest. As a result, the DoD usually 
assigns all offerors the same confidence rating in order to “level the playing field” and uses 
other evaluation factors to discriminate among proposals. Not surprisingly, the government 
often fails to select a business partner with an established history of high performance and 
relevant experience. 
The OFPP (1997) conducted a pilot test with 30 contracts that used past 
performance as a significant evaluation factor. Those contracts identified a 20% increase in 
average customer satisfaction, confirming the assertion that the increased use of past 
performance provides improved results (OFPP, 1997, p. 2). To improve how the DoD 
leverages past performance in its source selections, the remainder of this section reviews 
proposed solutions that leverage well-founded best practices to mitigate the risks associated 
with inadequate past performance evaluations. 
Proposed Solutions 
Alpha Contracting Negotiations With Pre-Qualified Vendor Candidates 
Alpha contracting negotiations with pre-qualified vendors leverage the best practices 
of the Qualifications-Based Selection (QBS) strategy authorized for Architecture and 
Engineering (A/E) contracts under FAR (2010) Part 36. The QBS strategy was originally 
developed because certain creative professional services cannot be fairly priced before the 
creative process has taken place. The QBS process improves innovation, quality, and 
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creativity by allowing the government to negotiate the contract requirements and pricing 
jointly with the contractor. The Brooks Act of 1972 delineates the framework for QBS using 
the following phased approach: 
1. The government determines the desired qualifications, including the 
experience and demonstrated competence of interested parties. The 
information provided by the offerors should emphasize technical ability (cost 
is not considered as part of the initial evaluation).  
2. The government creates a short list, ranking the bidders by their 
qualifications.  
3. The government conducts interviews with the firms on the short list and then 
re-ranks the firms. 
4. Finally, the government negotiates a statement of work (SOW) and fair price 
with the most qualified firm. 
Unfortunately, the FAR only allows use of QBS for contracts involving the 
construction or building trades, including transportation systems. However, the DoD could 
leverage some of the benefits offered by the A/E procurement strategy by combining some 
QBS attributes with other contracting best practices and strategies. For example, the DoD 
can use a prequalification process to narrow the pool of qualified vendors, similar to step 1 
in the QBS process. This can be done by using an advisory multi-step process described in 
FAR (2010) Part 15.202, or by establishing a competitive range based entirely on past 
performance criteria. Narrowing the field of vendor candidates would ensure that the DoD 
optimizes its time and resources by conducting Request for Proposal (RFP) activities only 
with the vendors that have the highest likelihood of being selected for contract award. This 
approach also benefits potential contractors, because they do not have to expend valuable 
proposal development funds for solicitations they have little chance of winning.  
Processes to narrow down the pool of qualified vendors on the basis of past 
performance and experience can require upfront time and investment from the government. 
However, these strategies can save significant time during the “back end” of the proposal 
evaluation. Ranking the vendors also helps keep competitive pressures in play during 
negotiations. The government mitigates the disadvantages associated with a sole-source 
negotiation environment because it maintains the flexibility to move to the next-ranked 
vendor at any point in the negotiations. 
Additionally, the DoD can use a Q&A session as part of an oral presentation 
strategy, similar to the QBS interview process described in Step 3 above and in the Evaluate 
Key Personnel Using Oral Presentations section of this paper. Open communication with 
vendors to verify experience and qualifications is an important, but often overlooked, activity. 
Usually the government accepts the qualifications and experience stated in a company’s 
proposal at face value. However, greater insight regarding the contractor’s related 
experience and the qualifications of the proposed key personnel would increase the 
accuracy of the government’s assessment. 
Lastly, the DoD can apply the same SOW and contract price-negotiation process 
described in Step 4 of the QBS through the use of alpha contracting, an innovative strategy 
that allows the government to perform many activities jointly with the contractor. Together, 
the government and contractor develop the SOW and proposal in a streamlined fashion. 
This process offers a number of advantages and performance improvements, such as 
enhancing communication, refining and clarifying requirements, and ensuring the technical 
solution is bounded by the capabilities of the contractor. The alpha contracting process also 
has the potential to yield significant savings in time and cost. For example, the Army PM-
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Tank Main Armament Systems M830A1 procurement utilized the alpha contracting process 
and reduced the lead-time for procurement administration by 55%, thus saving $1 million, 
which was subsequently used to buy additional units (Jones, n.d.). 
It may be possible to combine all of the above techniques and use a General 
Services Administration (GSA) Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) to model the QBS 
strategy from Steps 1–4. Under this arrangement, the DoD could select a set of contractors 
from a GSA schedule and use a prequalification process to narrow the field of vendors. 
Next, the DoD would use a Q&A process to interview candidates and rank order the 
potential vendors. The DoD could then utilize the alpha contracting process to negotiate a 
BPA with the highest ranked firm. If negotiations with the top-ranked vendor resulted in 
unfair pricing, or if the DoD and the vendor were unable to agree on an SOW, the DoD 
would have the right to conduct negotiations with the second-ranked firm. When 
negotiations were complete, the DoD would issue a BPA using a GSA schedule contract 
authorized under FAR (2010) Part 8.405-3. 
This GSA BPA approach has certain restrictions that may limit applicability across a 
broad range of acquisitions (e.g., GSA BPAs are limited to commercial products and 
services and do not allow cost-type contracts [FAR, 2010, Subpart 13.303]). Furthermore, 
the QBS approach is currently limited to A/E contracts authorized under FAR (2010) Part 36. 
However, the need for creativity and innovation is not limited to A/E procurements. Agile 
software development, for example, values flexibility, innovation, and collaboration and can 
greatly benefit from a QBS-like acquisition approach.  
As a result, the DoD should pursue an amendment to FAR (2010) Part 15 to allow a 
QBS-like process that can be leveraged for many different types of acquisitions. The DoD 
could achieve maximum benefit from this approach if the amendment allowed a 
prequalification process to narrow the field of potential vendors. An interview or Q&A 
process could facilitate the vendor ranking process, and alpha contracting would allow the 
DoD to negotiate an SOW and pricing based on the ranking of firms. All of these individual 
strategies are permitted under different areas of the FAR; however, a FAR Part 15 
amendment would allow the DoD to combine them into a single process to obtain maximum 
benefit. 
Product Demonstrations as a Source Selection Technique 
The limited availability of past performance information makes it difficult to verify the 
relevance of previous experience. As an alternative strategy, the DoD could use 
demonstrations as part of the source selection process to validate previous experience. A 
demonstration could include any material representation of past experience (e.g., 
prototypes, software demonstrations). Using this strategy, the DoD would require vendors to 
submit a functioning prototype, or a previously developed relevant product, and to 
demonstrate its capabilities as part of the proposal process. The DoD could apply this 
strategy to both hardware and software procurements; for example, screen mock-ups and 
software demonstrations from previous efforts could be used to evaluate certain software 
procurements. The demonstration could be submitted prior to the formal proposal process, 
or could be used to supplement a written technical proposal. The proposal instructions 
would specify the desired functionality of the demonstrated product, and thoroughly describe 
how the DoD would evaluate the demonstration.  
This source selection strategy will not only help to narrow the pool of qualified 
vendors, but will also offer a way for vendors to establish recent and relevant experience. 
The demonstration becomes a tangible piece of evidence that the contractor has verified 
and proven its experience with the technology and/or solution proposed. 
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Problem: The DoD Lacks Consistent and Thorough Processes to Evaluate Key 
Personnel 
The overall experience and business processes of the contractor are central to 
evaluation of past performance. However, the qualifications of the personnel proposed for 
key roles on the contract have even greater importance for the future success of the 
program. The capabilities of the key personnel proposed should reflect the strength of the 
company’s experience.  
DoD processes should aspire not only to select the strongest contractor, but also to 
ensure that the contractor assigns the “A Team” to the program. When companies know 
their key personnel will be closely evaluated, they have an incentive to offer their best 
performers, rather than simply personnel who meet minimal qualification requirements. Top-
performing personnel with a proven track record will also be inclined to ensure the technical 
solution proposed can be executed with acceptable risk, potentially providing internal checks 
and balances with the proposal writing team.  
Today, contractors generally identify key personnel and include their resumes as part 
of the proposal package, but most source selections limit evaluation of these key personnel 
to a simple check of whether the proposed team members meet experience criteria. The 
DoD should have consistent and thorough processes for the evaluation of key personnel 
that go beyond a checklist of experience criteria. This paper recommends that the DoD 
increase the use of oral presentations to verify the qualifications of key personnel. 
Proposed Solution 
Evaluate Key Personnel Using Oral Presentations 
Throughout the government, oral presentations are often used in conjunction with 
written proposals to clarify or support all or some aspect of the contractor’s technical and/or 
management proposal (Sade, n.d.). These presentations can greatly enhance the evaluation 
process. They give the government an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
contractor’s communication style, clarify the contractor’s proposal, and assess the group 
dynamics of the contractor team. In addition, oral presentations remove the gloss created by 
professional proposal writers and give the government an opportunity to interact directly with 
the contractor team that will perform the day-to-day tasks required in the contract.  
The DoD should take advantage of this opportunity to interact directly with key 
vendor personnel. To further enhance the benefits of these interactions, the DoD should 
mandate that proposed key personnel present the oral proposals. This prevents contractors 
from using their best marketing representatives to make presentations and gives the 
government an opportunity to evaluate the overall strength of the contractor team that will 
perform the actual program tasks. 
In addition, the DoD should use the Q&A portion of presentation to verify the 
qualifications and experience of key personnel. The DoD can review the resumes of the 
proposed personnel ahead of time, and prepare targeted questions that will help the 
government understand the breadth and depth of proposed key personnel. The government 
should structure questions according to behavioral interviewing techniques: asking 
questions that require the candidates to describe a past situation in which they exhibited a 
certain attribute. This strategy is used by more than 70% of Fortune 500 companies, which 
credit it with being 55% predictive of future on-the-job-behavior (Hansen, n.d.).  
The DoD’s evaluation of key personnel should go beyond verifying a checklist of 
experience criteria. Key considerations must include formal assessments of the contractor’s 
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trustworthiness with respect to foreign influence and control, the rigor of corporate security 
protocols, and the integrity of the contractor’s global supply chain relationships. 
Lastly, the contract should include key personnel clauses that protect the 
government from “bait-and-switch” tactics. In some instances, contractors have replaced the 
team originally proposed with potentially less qualified candidates shortly after contract 
award. To mitigate this risk, DoD contracts should require that the key personnel originally 
proposed on the contract remain with the program for a minimum time period (e.g., 12–18 
months), unless that individual leaves the company. This becomes especially important if 
the government uses key personnel as an important evaluation factor in the source selection 
process. 
Problem: The DoD Lacks the Adequate Tools and Information to Collect, 
Analyze, and Report Past Performance Information Consistently Across 
Contracts 
A high-quality data repository greatly strengthens the government’s ability to 
evaluate past performance as part of the source selection process. Well-documented 
information, easily accessible in such repositories, enables the government to defend its 
position during a contract protest. Thus, a data-driven process to collect, analyze, and report 
past performance information is critical in allowing the government to incorporate past 
performance in a source selection decision.  
As noted in the Introduction, two important past performance tools used today are 
CPARS and PPIRS. CPARS is a suite of web-enabled applications that document 
contractors’ past performance in accordance with the FAR. It uses an electronic workflow to 
automate contracting officers’ evaluations of contractor performance. It also allows 
contractors to submit comments electronically in response to a government assessment and 
either concur or non-concur. The DoD-developed PPIRS is a web-enabled government 
enterprise application supporting source selections. Since the FAR requires all federal 
agencies to post contractor performance evaluations in PPIRS, it now acts as the 
government-wide warehouse for information on contractor past performance (PPIRS, n.d.).2 
As a warehouse, it allows query-based, read-only retrieval and review of contractor data by 
qualified government acquisition personnel. Contractors can view their own data by using a 
central contractor registration to gain access.  
Although the FAR requires the government to evaluate past performance, the 
collection and reporting of past performance data has been inconsistent and often untimely. 
The lack of consistent, available, and reliable data hinders the DoD’s ability to make past 
performance an effective part of the proposal evaluation process. The government has 
recently made improvements to many of the past performance tools, including CPARS and 
PPIRS, to provide commonality of data entry format and increase the availability of data for 
retrieval. Despite these improvements, current data repositories still perform their functions 
inadequately, or are used inaccurately across the DoD. The problems with the government’s 
current data repositories have plagued the DoD for years. Poor data quality, incompatible 
data formats, inconsistent reporting timeliness, lack of data entry, diffused accountability, 
and subjective evaluations are among the issues associated with the way the DoD has 
collected, analyzed, and reported past performance information. 
 
                                                
2 However, it should be noted that while all federal acquisitions are required to use the PPIRS, not all 
government organizations have complied. 
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Proposed Solutions 
Implement and Enforce DoD Policies for Past Performance 
The OFPP and the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) Directorate 
in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]) have recently issued guidance and policy that emphasize the importance of 
information on past performance. Current policies, however, lack appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms to make this policy effective and actionable. The OUSD[AT&L]/DPAP should, 
therefore, issue a DoD-wide mandate to populate past performance databases in a timely 
and consistent manner. Per FAR (2010) Part 42.15, the responsibility for reporting past 
performance resides with the contracting officer, but it is important to make this a shared 
responsibility between the PMO and the contracting office. The program team (e.g., program 
manager, contracting officer’s technical representative [COTR]) should evaluate how well 
the contractor is performing against the SOW requirements. The contracting office should 
collect this information from the PMO and also provide input on the contractor’s performance 
against the contract requirements (e.g., reporting requirements, terms and conditions). The 
contracting office should have ultimate responsibility for collecting this information and 
populating the past performance database in a timely and consistent manner. 
The DoD should increase enforcement of this policy through a variety of 
mechanisms. Agencies should be required to report metrics on how well they are complying 
with this mandate. The OUSD[AT&L]/DPAP should collect these metrics on a monthly basis 
and publish the results on the DPAP’s website. The head of each Combatant Command, 
Service, or Agency (C/S/A) should be held accountable for C/S/A-wide compliance with this 
policy. 
Additionally, the DoD should require that past performance reviews become a 
mandatory part of Program Executive Office (PEO) acquisition program reviews. This will 
ensure that program offices are held accountable for meeting this policy requirement. As a 
further incentive, the DoD should prohibit programs from exercising option awards, award 
terms, or award fee payouts until they have populated past performance into a database. 
Lastly, the DoD should include an evaluation of compliance with this process as part 
of each contracting officer’s annual pay and performance review. Metrics that report 
compliance with this mandate at the individual contracting officer level will further enhance 
the enforcement of this policy. 
Identify Quantifiable Metrics for Agency-Wide Reporting 
Past performance evaluations today are based entirely on subjective judgments by 
the evaluator. This makes it difficult to compare performance across programs and 
contractors. Additionally, observations show that program managers and contracting officers 
are often reluctant to report negatively on past performance because this can reflect poorly 
on their own ability to manage the program or contract. Furthermore, to avoid conflict with 
the contractor, the government may refrain from documenting performance deficiencies in 
official databases. As a result, the past performance write-up does not always reflect a 
contractor’s performance accurately.  
The DoD should agree on a set of quantifiable metrics to capture in data fields within 
databases of past performance. The use of such quantifiable and simple yes/no metrics can 
provide a consistent and reliable way to compare contractor performance across contracts. 
For example, earned value management (EVM) data can be used to report cost and 
schedule performance on complex acquisitions. Award fee determinations can also provide 
a metric, since this is a bilateral agreement and contractors often use this metric to measure 
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their own performance. Simple yes/no metrics can be used for non-EVM contracts. Such 
questions could include the following: Did the contractor perform within proposed cost? Did 
the contractor deliver on time? Did the program encounter a Nunn-McCurdy breach? Each 
of the metrics and questions can be followed by a data field that allows the government to 
explain the evaluations provided.  
Include Validated and Approved Contract Deliverables Into Past Performance 
Databases 
The DoD can increase the quantity and quality of the data in past performance 
databases by incorporating information on validated and approved contract deliverables. For 
example, summary narratives on award fees provide a wealth of information on how the 
contractor performed during the award fee period. As noted above, award fees reflect 
consensus between the government and contractor on the factors that contributed to the 
final fee. This type of information can be very useful during evaluations of past performance, 
since it gives the DoD a more complete picture of how well the contractor performed over 
the life of a contract.  
Lastly, past performance databases should include a mechanism for uploading 
documents directly into CPARS to share with other government counterparts. This would 
greatly enrich the quality and quantity of past performance data.  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The lack of adequate past performance data, tools, and processes hinders the 
government from effectively evaluating the qualifications of companies and key personnel. 
The DoD tends to deemphasize past performance evaluations during the competitive source 
selection process, largely because data that would allow it to discriminate among proposals 
is unavailable. Current government tools have proven inadequate to collect, analyze, and 
report information on past performance. The absence of timely, reliable, documented data 
impedes the entire cycle of collecting, reporting, and evaluating past performance during 
source selection (see Figure 1). The inability to use past performance as a predictor of 
future contract success places the DoD at risk of repeating program mistakes. 
 
Figure 1. Past Performance Cycle 
Evaluating a company’s performance record allows the government to assess the 
effectiveness of a contractor’s management processes, tools, and resources. Because 
effective performance depends on qualified and experienced personnel who know how to 
replicate success, the ability to evaluate proposed key personnel also becomes an important 
aspect of estimating a company’s ability to meet the contract requirements. Yet the DoD 
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also lacks the necessary processes to assess the capabilities of the key personnel proposed 
on a contract. 
The DoD currently lacks a comprehensive approach to tackle the issues identified in 
this paper. Since the problems are interdependent, they require a holistic approach that 
addresses the tools, processes, and policies surrounding the past performance cycle 
pictured in Figure 1. The processes will not improve without adequate tools to provide the 
data. They will not be effective without the proper policies in place to enforce them, and they 
cannot be implemented without the proper processes and tools to support them.  
The recommendations summarized in the following list have been brought forward 
throughout this paper as important steps toward improving the DoD’s probability of 
achieving successful future program outcomes:  
1. Use alpha contracting negotiations with pre-qualified vendor candidates. 
Amend FAR Part 15 to allow for a QBS-like approach across a broader range 
of acquisitions. 
2. Use product demonstrations as part of source selection to increase accuracy 
in evaluations of the contractor’s performance record.  
3. Include oral presentations in the evaluation process; improve the consistency 
and depth of personnel evaluations by using the Q&A process to verify the 
qualifications and experience cited in proposed key personnel resumes.  
4. Issue a policy-wide mandate that enforces past performance data-entry 
standards. Use an online tool to track and report compliance to this policy 
requirement. 
5. Agree on a set of quantifiable metrics to capture in data fields within 
databases of past performance. 
6. Increase the quantity and quality of data in past performance databases by 
incorporating information on validated and approved contract deliverables. 
References 
DoD. (2003, May). A guide to collection and use of past performance information. Washington, DC: 
Author. 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2010). 
GAO. (2009, April). Better performance information needed to support agency contract award 
decisions (GAO-09-374). Washington, DC: Author. 
Gordon, D. I. (2011, January 21). Improving contractor past performance assessments: Summary of 
the Office of Federal Procurement policy’s review, and strategies for improvement.  
Hansen, K. (n.d.). Behavioral job interviewing strategies for job-seekers. Retrieved from 
http://www.Quintcareers.com 
Inspector General. (2008, February 29). Contractor past performance information (D-2008-057). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
Jones, A. (n.d.). PM-TMAS’s M830A1 alpha contracting process. Retrieved from 
http://procnet.pica.army.mil/Reference/articles/Archives/120mm.htm 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP]. (1997, December). Past performance (White paper). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP], Office of Management and Budget [OMB], Executive 
Office of the President. (2000, May). Best practices for collecting and using current and past 
performance information. Washington, DC: Author. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=moldo^jW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -=350 - 
=
Past Performance Information Retrieval System. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.ppirs.gov 
Sade, M. (n.d.). Seven steps to performance-based acquisition. Retrieved from 
http://www.acquisition.gov 
Acknowledgements 
Sponsor: Department of Defense, AT&L 
Dept. No.: E522 
Project No.: 0712ECSE-PB 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
RRR=aóÉê=oç~ÇI=fåÖÉêëçää=e~ää=
jçåíÉêÉóI=`^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.net 
 
